Auditable Register Emulations by Cogo, Vinicius V. & Bessani, Alysson
Auditable Register Emulations
Vinicius V. Cogo Alysson Bessani
LASIGE, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
Abstract
The widespread prevalence of data breaches amplifies the importance of auditing storage
systems. Here we initiate the study of auditable storage emulations, which provides the capa-
bility for an auditor to discover the previously executed reads in a register. We precisely define
the notion of auditable register and its properties, and establish tight bounds and impossibility
results for auditable storage emulations in a Byzantine setting. Our formulation considers read-
write registers that securely store data using information dispersal and support fast reads. In
such scenario, given a maximum number f of faulty storage objects and a minimum number τ
of data blocks required to recover a written value, we prove that (1) auditability is impossible
if τ ≤ 2f ; (2) τ ≥ 3f + 1 is required for implementing a weak form of auditability; and (3) a
stronger form of auditability is impossible. We also show that totally ordering operations or
using non-fast reads enables such strong auditability, albeit requiring more replicas.
1 Introduction
Motivation. Characteristics like cost-effectiveness, high scalability, and ease of use promoted the
migration from private storage infrastructures to public multi-tenant clouds in the last decade.
Security and privacy concerns were the main deterrents for this migration since the beginning [33].
Numerous secure storage systems have been proposing the use of advanced cryptographic primitives
to securely disperse data across multiple clouds (i.e., independent administrative domains) to reduce
the risk of data breaches [30].
Given a secure storage system composed of n storage objects, these information dispersal tech-
niques split and convert the original data item into n coded blocks [21, 26, 30]. Each coded block
is stored in a different object and clients need to obtain only τ out of n coded blocks to effectively
recover the original data. In this type of solution, no object contains the whole data item, which
differentiates information dispersal from fully-replicated storage systems (e.g., [1, 4, 24])—where
each object stores a full copy of the data.
Despite the advances in secure storage systems, the increasing severity of data breaches (e.g., [28])
and the tightening of privacy-related regulations (e.g., GDPR [11]) have been driving the demand
for further improvements on this topic. For instance, auditability [19] may enable the systematic
verification of who has effectively read data in secure storage systems. Notably, such verification
will allow one to separate these users from the whole set of clients that are authorized to read data
but have never done so. It is an important step to detect data breaches (including those caused by
authorized users, e.g., Snowden’s case [15]), analyze leakages, and sanction misuses.
Problem. In this paper, we address the following question: How to extend Byzantine-resilient
storage emulations with the capability of auditing who has effectively read data? The answer must
encompass the techniques used in these emulations, such as information dispersal [21, 26, 30] and
(available) Byzantine quorum systems [24], for providing a R/W register abstraction [22]. More
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specifically, we address the problem of protecting storage systems from readers trying to obtain
data without being detected (i.e., audit completeness) and protecting correct readers from faulty
storage objects trying to incriminate them (i.e., audit accuracy).
Related Work. Several auditing schemes were proposed to verify the integrity of data stored in
multi-tenant external infrastructures [20, 25, 32]. They mainly focus on cryptographic techniques
to produce retrievability proofs without the need to fetch all data from the system (e.g., [18, 36])
or on providing public integrity verification (e.g., [34, 35]). However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no previous work on auditing who has effectively read data in a dispersed storage.
Another topic related to our work is the accountability, which focuses on making systems’ com-
ponents accountable in a way their actions become non-repudiable [13, 37]. Works in the account-
ability literature have discussed generic scenarios for networked systems [14], described the necessary
cryptographic building blocks [13, 37], or how evidences should be stored and protected [14].
Several other works have explored the space complexity of fault-tolerant register emulations
(e.g., [2, 7, 9, 10]), including disintegrated storage [5] (e.g., [3, 6, 31]). However, none of these
works focuses on the quorum requirements for auditing read accesses in a storage system despite the
existence of Byzantine objects.
Contributions. This paper initiates the study of auditing in Byzantine-resilient storage by pre-
senting lower bounds and impossibility results related with the implementation of an auditable
register on top of n base objects despite the existence of f faulty ones. Our results show that, given
a minimum number τ of data blocks required to recover a data item from information dispersal
schemes, (1) auditability is impossible with τ ≤ 2f (or n ≤ 4f); (2) when fast reads (reads executed
in a single communication round-trip [12]) are supported, τ ≥ 3f + 1 (or n ≥ 5f + 1) is required for
implementing a weak form of auditability, while a stronger form of auditability is impossible; and
(3) totally ordering operations and using non-fast reads can still provide such strong auditability.
2 Preliminaries
SystemModel. Our system is composed of an arbitrary number of client processes Π = {p1, p2, ...},
which interact with a set of n storage objects O = {o1, o2, ..., on}. Clients can be subdivided
into three main classes: writers ΠW = {pw1, pw2, ...}, readers ΠR = {pr1, pr2, ...}, and auditors
ΠA = {pa1, pa2, ...}. These different roles do not necessarily mean they have to be performed by
different processes.
A configuration C is a vector of the states of all entities (i.e., processes and objects) in the system.
An initial configuration is a specific configuration where all entities of the system are in their initial
states. An algorithm A defines the behavior of processes in Π as deterministic state machines,
which can modify the system’s states through actions (e.g., invoke and response). An execution
segment is a (finite or infinite) sequence of alternated configurations and actions. An execution ρ is
an execution segment that begins in an initial configuration. An event is the occurrence of an action
in an execution. Clients invoke operations in the storage objects and wait for responses. Low-level
operations in objects are instantaneous, atomic actions.
A sequence of invocations and responses compose a history σ of the system. We consider
the following relationships between operations within a history. First, if a history σ contains the
invocation of an operation op1 and its response, then op1 is complete in σ. Otherwise, if σ contains
only the former, then operation op1 is pending. Second, if the response of an operation op1 precedes
the invocation of another operation op2 in σ, then op1 precedes op2. Third, if operations op1 and
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op2 do not precede each other in σ, then they are concurrent. Fourth, a history σ that does not
contain concurrent operations is considered sequential.
Fault Model. Clients (i.e., writers, readers, and auditors) and storage objects that obey their
specifications are said to be correct. Faulty readers can be either malicious or honest. Malicious (i.e.,
Byzantine) faulty readers may behave arbitrarily, i.e., combining omissive and assertive behaviors.
For instance, they may deviate from the protocol specification by invoking contradictory operations
in all or only some storage objects. Alternatively, honest faulty readers may only crash.
Faulty writers and faulty auditors are honest and can only fail by crashing. Writers are trusted
because they are the data owners, who are the most interested part in the auditable register we are
proposing in this work. This is a common assumption in the BFT storage literature (e.g., [6, 24])
since malicious writers could write invalid values anyway, compromising the application’s state.
Furthermore, auditors are also trusted because they are controlled either by the same entity as
writers or third-party entities writers trust.
A faulty storage object may deviate from its specification arbitrarily—i.e., data can be created,
corrupted, deleted, or leaked to unauthorized parties [23]. They can also present omissive behavior,
intermittent or not. Although our system tolerates the aforementioned faults, it operates correctly
only if no more than f storage objects are faulty.
R/W Register Specification. A read-write (R/W) register is an object that stores a data value
v from any domain V and provides two low-level operations [22]:
• rw-write(v): writes the data value v ∈ V, passed as argument, in the data object and returns
an ack to confirm the operation succeed.
• rw-read(): returns the data value v ∈ V currently stored in the data object or ⊥ if no value
has been written on it.
The behavior of a R/W register is given by its sequential specification, where every low-level
rw-read operation on it returns the value written by the last preceding rw-write operation on this
object, or the special value ⊥/∈ V if no such operation exists.
Emulated Registers. We emulate a shared register that stores a value v from domain V using
R/W registers. It exposes high-level s-read() and s-write(v) operations to processes in Π. We
consider multi-writer multi-reader (MWMR) registers where multiple writers from Πw invoke s-
write operations and multiple readers from ΠR invoke s-read operations. Our safety requirement
is the safe semantics: a read can return any value if it is concurrent with a write operation, and
returns the value written by the most recent write operation if there is no write operation concurrent
with the read [22]. Our liveness requirement is wait-freedom, where every operation invoked by a
process p returns within a finite number of events [17]. High-level read operations (e.g., s-read) in
our system are fast reads.
Definition 1 (Fast read [12]). An s-read operation is fast if it completes in a single communication
round-trip between the reader and the storage objects.
Information Dispersal. Storage objects in O are untrusted independent entities. We assume
they store data in blocks generated using information dispersal schemes (i.e., a special case of
disintegrated storage [5]) such as erasure codes [26, 27] and secret sharing [21, 29].
In these schemes, a high-level s-write(v) operation wv converts a value v ∈ V into n coded blocks
bv1 , bv2 , ..., bvn from a domain B. Each coded block bvk produced in wv is marked with a unique
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write label lwv and sent to the kth storage object in the system. These techniques guarantee that no
object ok stores an entire copy of value v and no client process recovers v by accessing less than a
certain fraction of these blocks. For simplicity, we assume every distinct value is written only once.
A high-level s-read() operation recovers the original value v from any subset of a specific number
(τ) of correct blocks bvk written in wv. It means readers do not need to fetch blocks from all (n)
storage objects. More specifically, we introduce the notion of an effective read as described in
Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Effective read). A value v ∈ V, written in wv, is effectively read by a reader pr, in
history σ, when pr has read τ correct blocks bvk of wv from different objects ok.
Note that an effective read depends only on the number of correct blocks (written in the same
write wv) that a reader pr has already obtained from different objects. Reader pr does not necessarily
obtain all these blocks on a single s-read operation. There might exist cases where it is accomplished
only after receiving responses from many subsequent s-read operations.
We also consider information dispersal schemes have a maximum number of Byzantine faults
f tolerated at the same time. As a consequence, the minimum number of blocks to recover the
original data must comply with Proposition 1, which guarantees that f malicious objects cannot
create nonexistent correct values.
Proposition 1. Any information dispersal scheme requires τ > f to tolerate up to f Byzantine
faults [16].
Available f-Threshold Byzantine Quorum Systems. An available (f -threshold) quorum
system guarantees the consistency and availability of stored data by executing operations in only
a subset (i.e., a quorum Q) of storage objects, instead of requiring clients to communicate with all
of them to execute high-level operations. We consider all protocols in this paper require Byzantine
quorum systems, which contain at least f + 1 objects at the intersection of the quorums of any two
operations [24].
To provide wait-free register emulations using quorum systems in asynchronous environments,
these systems need to be available.
Definition 3 (Available f -threshold quorums [24]). Any available f -threshold quorum Q is com-
posed of q = n− f replicas to tolerate up to f faults.
We assume available quorums are composed of q = n− f replicas (instead of q ≤ n− f [24])
because we are interested in the limit case where quorums of maximum size are used. Using available
quorums guarantees that any complete s-write operation wv stores correctly labeled blocks in at
least a quorum of storage objects. At any point in history σ, an object that participated in the
quorum of the last preceding s-write is considered an up-to-date object, whereas an object that did
not participate on it is considered stale.
Finally, we assume that information dispersal schemes (e.g., erasure codes) are implemented
using available quorums and comply with Proposition 2 to tolerate up to f Byzantine objects. This
proposition defines the required minimum number (n) of objects to be present in the whole system.
Proposition 2. Any available Byzantine fault-tolerant τ -of-n information dispersal scheme requires
at least n ≥ τ + 2f replicas to tolerate up to f faulty objects [16].
This bound comes from the fact that available quorums require the response from only n − f
replicas, with up to f of these responses from malicious objects. Note that malicious readers can
obtain τ correct blocks without accessing a quorum of storage objects.
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3 Auditable Register Emulations
We extend the aforementioned register emulation by adding an operation getLog() to the storage
objects (i.e., R/W registers). Invoking this operation on object ok returns the log Lk containing
records of every preceding read executed in this object. A record 〈pr, lwv〉k ∈ Lk contains the
identifier of the reader pr and the write label lwv associated with the value v whose the block bvk
was read by pr.
Based on these individual fail-prone logs, we define an auditable register emulation that has
access to a virtual log L ,
⋃
k∈{1..n} Lk from which we can infer who has effectively read a value
from the register. This emulation provides three high-level operations: a-write(v), a-read(), and
a-audit(). An a-write(v) is an unmodified s-write(v) described in the previous section. An a-read()
is an extended s-read() that reads blocks bvk from a quorum of objects, causing 〈pr, lwv〉k to be
added to Lk on each accessed correct storage object ok.
Finally, the third operation is an a-audit(). It obtains records from L and produces a set of
evidences E about the values read. Each evidence Epr,v contains a set of at least ` records from
different storage objects, which proves that v was effectively read by each reader pr in history σ.
We are interested in auditing effective reads because we intend to audit who has actually read a
data value v—including malicious readers that do not follow the read protocol and leave operations
pending. A correct auditor receives E and reports all evidenced reads.
An auditable register provides an a-audit() operation that guarantees completeness and at least
one form of accuracy, as stated in Definitions 4–6.
Definition 4 (Completeness). Every value v ∈ V effectively read by a reader pr before the invoca-
tion of an a-audit in history σ is reported in E resulting from this audit operation, i.e., Epr,v ∈ E.
Definition 5 (Weak Accuracy). A correct reader pr that has never invoked an a-read before the
invocation of an a-audit in history σ will not be reported in E resulting from this audit operation,
i.e., ∀v ∈ V, Epr,v /∈ E.
Definition 6 (Strong Accuracy). A correct reader pr that has never effectively read a value v ∈ V
before the invocation of an a-audit in history σ will not be reported in E resulting from this audit
operation as having read v, i.e., Epr,v /∈ E.
While completeness is intended to protect the storage system from readers trying to obtain
data without being detected, accuracy focuses on protecting correct readers from malicious storage
objects incriminating them.
The difference between the weak and the strong variants of the accuracy property is in the pre-
cision of the auditor’s report. With weak accuracy, the audit reports only readers that have invoked
read operations, which already separates them from the whole set of clients that are authorized to
read a specific register but have never done so. With strong accuracy, the audit reports only the
values readers have effectively read. Strong accuracy implies weak accuracy.
Complementing the other side of the accuracy property, incorrect (honest or malicious) readers
may be reported by the audit in pending, incomplete, or partial reads. It means they had the
intention to read the data and aborted it or crashed while doing so.
4 Preliminary Results
Auditing fully-replicated systems is impossible in the presence of Byzantine objects because each
object stores a full copy of data and can alone give it to readers without logging the operations.
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Therefore, we consider information dispersal techniques as the basic form of disintegrated storage [5]
for auditable register emulations.
Records Available for Auditing Registers. In this section, we identify the minimum number
of records from every effective read that will be available for a-audit operations. This number is
then used to define the required number of records ` to produce an evidence Epr,v.
The three operations (write, read, and audit) of auditable registers are possibly executed on
different available quorums that need to intersect. The worst-case scenario is presented in Figure 1a,
where we illustrate the minimum intersections between each of these three quorums, identified as
groups G1−4. In this figure, every storage object belongs to a group and all objects within the same
group contain the same state.
Lemma 1. Any available a-audit() operation obtains at least τ − 2f records of every preceding
effective read in history σ.
Proof. Let us assume any available quorum system composed of n storage objects, where clients
wait for replies from q = n−f of them (Definition 3). Let us assume that, in the worst-case scenario,
the quorums Qw for an a-write(x), Qr for an a-read(), and Qa for an a-audit() operation differ as
depicted in Figure 1a. In this scenario, the size of the intersection |Qw ∩Qr ∩Qa| is n− 3f . From
these n− 3f objects, f of them are malicious and n− 4f are correct, up-to-date objects.
Let us assume a malicious reader that effectively reads a value v after accessing only τ objects
instead of contacting the whole quorum Qr. In the worst-case scenario, the malicious reader obtains
f correct blocks from malicious storage objects (that do not log the read); f blocks from correct,
up-to-date objects in G1 (that log the read but do not participate in the audit quorum Qa); and
n − 4f blocks from correct, up-to-date objects (that log the records and participate in Qa). Since
these n − 4f correct, up-to-date objects are the only ones that have both logged the records and
participate in Qa, by applying Proposition 2, we have that τ − 2f is the minimum number of
available records in L from Qa for detecting every value v effective read in the system.
Evidences are created in a-audit() only after finding, in L, at least ` records from different
objects attesting the same read value and reader.
Corollary 1. The required number (`) of records to produce an evidence Epr,v is ` ≤ τ − 2f .
5 Resilience Lower Bounds
We present impossibility results for the three properties of auditable registers: completeness (Def-
inition 4), weak accuracy (Definition 5), and strong accuracy (Definition 6). From this point on,
correct storage objects start a history σ with the initial configuration composed of blocks of a value
v ∈ V and an empty log L = ∅. For simplicity, we depict the log records 〈pr, lwv〉 as vr in the
figures.
Lemma 2. It is impossible to satisfy the completeness of auditable registers with τ ≤ 2f .
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that τ = 2f . According to Proposition 2, a system
with τ = 2f must have at least 4f nodes. Consider an auditable register implemented using four
subset groups of objects G1−4, as depicted in Figure 1b. Each group is composed of f objects.
Group G2 contains malicious objects that may behave arbitrarily.
A malicious reader pr1 obtains f coded blocks from the correct nodes in G3 (that log the
operation) and f blocks from the malicious nodes in G2 (which do not log the operation). This
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Figure 1: (a) The worst-case scenario of a triple quorum applied to auditable registers. (b) A
scenario where τ = 2f does not guarantee completeness. (c) A scenario where ` = f does not
guarantee weak accuracy.
malicious reader can decode the original value v after receiving the τ = 2f correct blocks, performing
thus an effective read. However, any audit quorum Qa that does not include at least one object from
group G3 will not receive any record for the read operation from reader pr1. This history violates
the completeness property since an evidence is never created if there is no record of this read to do
so.
Lemma 3. It is impossible to satisfy the weak accuracy of auditable registers with ` ≤ f .
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that ` = f . Consider an auditable register imple-
mented using three subset groups of objects G1−3, as depicted in Figure 1c, where the group G1 is
composed of at least τ objects and the remaining groups are composed of exactly f objects each.
Group G2 contains malicious objects that may behave arbitrarily and log a nonexistent read oper-
ation. Any audit quorum Qa that includes the f objects from group G2 will receive f records for a
read operation that has never been invoked. If ` = f is enough to create an evidence and report an
effective read, then a correct auditor must report it, violating the weak accuracy property.
The next theorem presents a scenario where these two properties are intended to be supported
simultaneously.
Theorem 1. It is impossible to satisfy both completeness and weak accuracy of auditable regis-
ters with τ ≤ 3f .
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that τ = 3f is enough to satisfy both the weak
accuracy and completeness properties. According to Proposition 2, a system with τ = 3f must have
at least 5f nodes. Consider an auditable register implemented using five subset groups of objects
G1−5, as depicted in Figure 2, where each group is composed of f objects and group G2 contains
only malicious objects.
In history σ1 (Figure 2a), a malicious reader pr1 obtains 2f coded blocks from correct objects
in G3 and G4 (that log the operation) and other f correct blocks from the malicious objects in G2
(which do not log the operation). Any audit quorum Qa will receive at least f records either from
the objects in group G3 or G4. Evidences are created using these ` ≥ f records to report the read,
satisfying completeness. However, as proved in Lemma 3 and illustrated in history σ2 (Figure 2b),
it is impossible to guarantee weak accuracy with ` ≤ f .
Now, we turn our attention to strong accuracy, i.e., the capability of an auditor to report exactly
which value v each reader pr has read.
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Figure 2: A scenario where τ = 3f does not guarantee both completeness and weak accuracy.
Lemma 4. It is impossible to satisfy the strong accuracy of auditable registers with ` < τ + f .
Proof. Let us assume without loss of generality that ` = τ + f − 1. Consider an auditable register
implemented using n ≥ 2f + τ objects divided in four subset groups of objects G1−4, as depicted
in Figure 3a, where group G3 is composed of τ − 1 objects, group G4 is composed of at least one
object, and the remaining groups are composed of exactly f objects each. Group G2 contains only
malicious objects.
A writer pw1 starts a write operation concurrently with a read operation from a correct reader
pr1. At a first moment, only objects from group G4 have received the write request and indeed wrote
the blocks for value x on their registers. Then, the read request arrives in objects from groups G2−4,
where: the f malicious objects from G2 return blocks for the wrong value m (and log the read of
v by pr1); τ − 1 correct objects from group G3 return blocks for the value v (and log it); and all
objects from group G4 correctly return blocks for the value x (and log the read of x by pr1). In
this history σ1, the reader pr1 has not received τ correct data blocks for value v, which means it is
unable to recover v.
However, any audit quorum Qa that includes objects from groups G2 and G3 will return τ+f−1
records 〈pr1, lwv〉k. If ` = τ + f − 1 is enough to produce an evidence of an effective read, then the
auditor will report this non-effective read, violating the strong accuracy property.
Theorem 2. It is impossible to satisfy both completeness and strong accuracy of auditable
registers.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume any number of blocks τ ≥ 2f + 1 required to
effectively read a value (Lemma 2). Consider an auditable register implemented using n ≥ 2f + τ
objects (Proposition 2) divided in seven subset groups of objects G1−7, as depicted in Figure 3b.
Group G1 is composed of f − 1 objects; G2 and G7 are composed of 1 object each; G3, G5, and G6
are composed of f objects each; and G4 is composed of τ − 2f − 1 objects. Group G3 contains only
malicious objects.
A writer pw1 executes a complete write operation in objects from groups G3−7. Then, a correct
reader pr1 executes a read operation in groups G1−5 and G7. Malicious objects from G3 return their
correct blocks for value x (but do not log the read operation). Reader pr1 receives exactly τ correct
data blocks and obtains the original value x (i.e., an effective read).
A second correct reader pr2 executes a read operation in groups G2−6. Malicious objects from
G3 do not return their correct blocks for value x (but they do log the read of x by pr2). Reader pr2
receives τ − 1 correct data blocks for value x, which is insufficient to recover the original value x
(i.e., a non-effective read). After these two reads, any audit quorum Qa receives the same number
or more records 〈pr2, lwx〉k of a non-effective read than records 〈pr1, lwx〉k of an effective read. For
instance, an audit quorum composed of objects G2−6 receives τ + f − 1 records 〈pr2, lwx〉k and
τ − f − 1 records 〈pr1, lwx〉k. Defining l = τ − f − 1 is enough to report the effective read from
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1: function a-audit( )
2: E ← ∅
3: L[1..n]←− ∅
4: parallel for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do
5: L[k]←− ok.getLog()
6: end parallel for
7: wait |{k : L[k] 6=⊥}| ≥ q
8: for all pr, lwv do
9: Epr,v ←
⋃
k∈{1..n}{〈pr, lwv 〉k ∈ L[k]}
10: if |Epr,v| ≥ ` then
11: E ← E ∪ {Epr,v}
12: end if
13: end for
14: return E
15: end function
(Algorithm 1)
Figure 3: (a) A scenario where ` < τ +f does not guarantee strong accuracy. (b) A generic scenario
that proves it is impossible to satisfy both completeness and strong accuracy of auditable registers.
(Algorithm 1) The a-audit() algorithm.
pr1, but it violates the strong accuracy by also reporting the non-effective read from pr2. As a
consequence, it is impossible to define a single reporting threshold ` to be used to produce evidences
without violating either completeness or strong accuracy.
Remark: Adding any number of objects to the scenario of Figure 3b does not change the
impossibility result of Theorem 2. The reason is that with the unlimited concurrency in our model,
each additional object may have a value vi different from all values stored in the other objects.
6 Audit Algorithm
We present a generic auditability algorithm for registers implemented on top of available f -threshold
quorum systems to prove that all bounds from the previous section (Lemmata 2–4 and Theorem 1)
are tight in our system model. In the present section, we prove that this algorithm satisfies the
completeness property with τ ≥ 2f+1 (Lemma 5) and the weak accuracy with ` ≥ f+1 (Lemma 6).
Then, we prove that it supports both completeness and weak accuracy with τ ≥ 3f+1 (Theorem 3).
Finally, we prove it supports the strong accuracy property alone with ` ≥ τ + f (Lemma 7).
The implementation for a-audit() is presented in Algorithm 1. It starts with an empty set E
that will be used to store the evidences attesting the effective reads (Line 2). It then queries n
storage objects to obtain the list of records on their logs (i.e., ok.getLog()), waits the response from
at least q of them, and stores these responses in the array of logs L (Lines 4–7).
For each previously seen record, it verifies if the number of different logs L[k] containing records
for the same reader pr and value v is at least `. In doing so, it adds the evidence Epr,v to the
reporting set of evidences E (Lines 8–11). After verifying all records, the audit operation returns
the set E (Line 14), which is used by auditors to report that the detected readers have effectively
read the mentioned data values.
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Lemma 5. Algorithm 1 satisfies the completeness property of auditable registers with τ ≥ 2f + 1.
Proof. Let us assume τ ≥ 2f + 1. Then in this case, based on Corollary 1 (i.e., ` ≤ τ − 2f), any
audit quorum Qa receives at least one record from a correct, up-to-date storage object that has
participated on each effective read (i.e., ` ≥ 1). Consequently, Algorithm 1 satisfies completeness
by obtaining the records from any audit quorum Qa if τ ≥ 2f + 1.
Lemma 6. Algorithm 1 satisfies the weak accuracy of auditable registers with ` ≥ f + 1.
Proof. To support the weak accuracy of auditable registers, Algorithm 1 simply needs to make the
f records from malicious objects insufficient to create an evidence reporting an effective read if a
correct reader has never invoked a read on any correct object. Therefore, ` ≥ f + 1 ensures that at
least one correct object has also received a read request from this client.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 satisfies both completeness and weak accuracy of auditable registers
with τ ≥ 3f + 1.
Proof. Assuming τ ≥ 3f + 1 directly satisfies completeness (Lemma 5). Based on Corollary 1 (i.e.,
` ≤ τ − 2f), any audit quorum Qa receives at least f + 1 records from correct, up-to-date storage
objects that have participated on each effective read. As proved in Lemma 6, ` ≥ f + 1 is enough
for Algorithm 1 to satisfy weak accuracy.
A consequence of Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 is that existing information dispersal schemes
that support fast reads, such as Hendricks et. al [16], require n ≥ 5f + 1 to support auditability.
Lemma 7. Algorithm 1 satisfies the strong accuracy of auditable registers with ` ≥ τ + f .
Proof. To support the strong accuracy property of auditable registers, evidences must be created
using at least τ records for the same value from correct, up-to-date storage objects that have
participate in the read—where τ > f (Proposition 1). Since f malicious servers can also participate
in any audit quorum Qa, this number must be added to the minimum number of records required
to create an evidence. These two requirements make strong accuracy satisfiable with ` ≥ τ + f by
accessing any audit quorum Qa because, in this case, the f malicious objects make no difference
when reporting a value effectively read by a correct reader.
7 Alternative Models for the Algorithm
As already proved in Theorem 2, it is impossible to satisfy both completeness and strong accuracy
of auditable registers in our model. In this section, we present two modifications on our assumptions
that allow Algorithm 1 to overcome the lower bound in Lemma 4 and satisfy both completeness
and strong accuracy.
7.1 Sequential Operations
Serializing operations using total order broadcast [8] allows our system to execute operations se-
quentially. By doing so, we limit the number of different values present in storage objects since
high-level read and write operations are executed in total order. In the worst case, the system
will have f objects with a correct but stale value and f malicious objects with arbitrary values.
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With this limitation, strong accuracy becomes easier, and then it can be satisfied together with
completeness.
Lemma 8. Totally ordering operations in our model allows Algorithm 1 to satisfy strong accuracy
with ` ≥ 2f + 1.
Proof. If there is no concurrent operations in the system, there will be always at most f correct
stale storage objects and f malicious ones. The worst case is when the f stale objects participate in
a read quorum Qr and the f malicious objects mimic them, resulting in 2f records for the read of
a stale value. Requiring ` ≥ 2f + 1 to create an evidence guarantees that it is achieved only when
a reader obtains at least 4f + 1 correct blocks from the same data value, which can only happen
with the most up-to-date value.
Theorem 4. Totally ordering operations in our model allows Algorithm 1 to satisfy both complete-
ness and strong accuracy with τ ≥ 4f + 1.
Proof. With τ ≥ 4f+1 and based on Lemma 1, any audit quorum Qa receives at least 2f+1 records
from correct, up-to-date storage objects that have participated on each effectively read value v. As
proved in Lemma 8, ` ≥ 2f + 1 is enough to satisfy strong accuracy in our model when there is no
concurrency. Moreover, this limitation does not change the lower bound of Lemma 5, which means
that τ ≥ 4f + 1 is enough for Algorithm 1 to also satisfy completeness in our model.
7.2 Non-fast Reads
There are read algorithms that use more than one communication round (i.e., a non-fast read [12])
to ensure correct readers will only fetch, from correct objects, the blocks of the most up-to-date
value stored in the register. For instance, DepSky-CA [6] is a register emulation in which the first
round of a read obtains the identifier of the most up-to-date value available in a quorum of objects,
while the second round actually reads the coded blocks for that value. As a consequence, correct
objects log reads from correct clients only if they hold the most up-to-date value available in a
quorum of objects.
Lemma 9. Applying Algorithm 1 to DepSky-CA protocol satisfies strong accuracy with ` ≥ f+1.
Proof. Let us assume registers follow DepSky-CA protocol [6] with two communication rounds in
read operations and τ ≥ 3f + 1. No read operation will result in correct records for more than
one data value and every read operation results in the creation of records in at least a quorum of
objects. In the worst-case scenario, the f malicious storage objects can only forge at most f records
for another value. Requiring ` ≥ f + 1 to create an evidence and report an effective read guarantees
that it is achieved only when the reported value was actually read in a quorum of objects.
Theorem 5. Applying Algorithm 1 to DepSky-CA protocol satisfies both completeness and strong
accuracy with τ ≥ 3f + 1.
Proof. Let us assume registers follow DepSky-CA protocol [6] with two communication rounds in
read operations. Assuming τ ≥ 3f + 1 and based on Lemma 1, any audit quorum Qa receives at
least f + 1 records from correct, up-to-date storage objects that have participated on each effective
read. As proved in Lemma 9, ` ≥ f +1 is enough to satisfy strong accuracy when using DepSky-CA
algorithm. Moreover, this limitation does not change the lower bound of Lemma 5, which means
that τ ≥ 3f + 1 is also enough to satisfy completeness.
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